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EU Free Movement of Capital and Third Countries: 
The SECIL Case
As it is well known, free movement of capital applies both 
within the EU and to third countries. Art. 63 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides in 
this respect that: “Within the framework of the provisions set 
out in this Chapter, all restrictions on the movement of capital 
between Member States and between Member States and 
third countries shall be prohibited”. In the landmark SECIL 
decision, the CJEU, in line with its recent case law, confirmed 
first of all that, with respect to a third country, free movement 
of capital becomes applicable as soon as the legislation 
at issue is not exclusively applicable to controlled group 
structures6). In the affirmative, a company established in a 
Member State may therefore rely on free movement of capital 
“in order to call into question the legality of such legislation, 
irrespective of the size of its shareholding”7). Secondly, the 
Court also held that, even in relation to a third country, a rule 
applying beyond “wholly artificial arrangements which do not 
reflect economic reality”8) may not be justified. In order words, 
the CJEU made it clear that provisions establishing an unre-
buttable presumption of tax evasion are not acceptable even 
where third countries such as Switzerland are involved9). 
Based on this case law, it could, thus, in the future be argued 
that a European domestic CFC rules designed according to 
ATAD and applying to third countries such as Switzerland be-
yond wholly artificial arrangements could possibly be regarded 
as an unjustified restriction to free movement of capital. This is 
because the ATAD CFC model potentially applies to cases in 
which the parent company is merely entitled to receive more 
than 50 % of the profits of the subsidiary10). In other words, 
the recent case law of the CJEU could represent a limit to EU 
fiscal protectionism and dictate, for example in the area of CFC 
legislation, that the same carve-out for genuine business ac-
tivities apply within and outside the internal market. Interest-
ingly, in a decision rendered on March 1, 2017, the French 
Conseil Constitutionnel has gone in this direction holding that 
a broader application of a CFC regime to third countries was 
contrary to the principle of equality of treatment11). 
EU Parent- Subsidiary Directive Involving a Group 
Structure Ultimately Controlled by a Swiss Resident 
Company
The second example which could ultimately be setting a limit 
to fiscal protectionism is the Eqiom SAS case (previously 
Holcim France) for which the Advocate General delivered her 
opinion on January 19, 2017. The case concerns the applica-
tion of the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the exemp-
tion from withholding tax on dividend distributions made by 
a French subsidiary to a Luxembourg company owned by a 
company in Cyprus which was in turn controlled by a com-
pany with its seat in Switzerland. 
At issue in the present case is the application of a provision 
of the French Tax Code (“Code Général des Impôts”) – Art. 
119b(3) CGI – which provides for a reversal of the burden 
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Introduction
EU corporate tax policy has recently been very much driven 
by the desire to implement the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting project (BEPS) within the internal market. The 
most comprehensive expression of this initiative crystallized in 
July 2016 with the adoption of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Direc-
tive (ATAD). ATAD, which was adopted after an intense politi-
cal debate, will require Member States to transpose into their 
domestic laws, as a general rule by December 31, 20181), 
certain measures forming part of the BEPS initiative. At the 
same time, however, ATAD goes further than the OECD 
project as it is intended to set a common minimum frame-
work against aggressive tax planning within the European 
Union. Accordingly, measures which have only led to recom-
mendations and best practices at the OECD level become a 
mandatory standard under the ATAD2).
This being said, from a policy perspective, ATAD also marks 
a shift towards a form of fiscal protectionism. A good example 
of this trend is the so-called “categorical” controlled foreign 
company rule found in the ATAD, which, on the one hand, will 
not apply to substantive economic activities within the internal 
market (so-called “carve-out clause”) but, on the other hand, 
may be applied by Member States to operations conducted 
in third countries even if such operations represent genuine 
business activities. The same trend is also confirmed by the 
proposals on a Common and Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB) which were released by the European Com-
mission on October 25, 2016. As it has been argued, this 
policy runs counter the core principles of the BEPS project 
which seeks to establish a level playing field to fight ag-
gressive tax planning3). Further, as regards Switzerland, this 
approach is also difficult to reconcile with the joint EU-Swiss 
statement of October 2014 in which it was agreed that anti-
avoidance rules should apply only if they are “justified”. 
Hopefully, when implementing the categorical CFC rule, 
some Member States (for example France) will choose to 
also apply a carve-out for genuine business activities con-
ducted in third countries such as Switzerland. Further, other 
Member States (typically those that do not currently have a 
CFC legislation) may opt for the alternative “transactional 
model” provided by the Directive which applies evenly within 
and outside the internal market and is limited to: “[t]he non-
distributed income of the entity or permanent establishment 
arising from non-genuine arrangements which have been put 
in place for the essential purpose of obtaining a tax advan-
tage (Art. 7(2)(b)).”
In this contribution we show, in addition, that the case law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), with which 
Member States have to comply, may well in the future repre-
sent a strong and welcome limit to this form of political fiscal 
protectionism. Two recent examples are provided to support 
this view. The first example is the judgment of November 24, 
2016, delivered by the CJEU in the SECIL case dealing with 
the application of free movement of capital to third countries4). 
The second example is the opinion of Advocate General Kokott 
of January 19, 2017 in the Eqiom SAS case (previously Holcim 
France) concerning a group structure involving Switzerland5). 
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of proof against the taxpayer where, as is the case in the 
present instance, a dividend distribution is made to an EU 
company ultimately controlled by a resident of a third coun-
try. In her opinion the Advocate General first of all considered 
that this provision is not compatible with Art. 1(2) of the EU 
Parent Subsidiary Directive which provides that: “[t]his Direc-
tive shall not preclude the application of domestic or agree-
ment-based provisions required for the prevention of fraud or 
abuse.” The Advocate General rightly noted that this provi-
sion requires the application of domestic anti-abuse rules of 
Member States to remain proportionate in the framework of 
the Directive. From this perspective, art. 119b (3) CGI is not 
compatible with the Directive in that it leads to a presumption of 
abuse in relation to third countries such as Switzerland and it is 
then up to the taxpayer to provide proof that the chain of inter-
ests is not essentially for tax purposes. 
This opinion, which is to be approved, stresses first of all that 
when fighting aggressive tax planning, Member States may 
not adopt disproportionate anti-abuse rules even where third 
countries, such as Switzerland in the present instance, are 
involved. In our opinion, the analysis of the Advocate Ge-
neral as regards the need to comply with principle of propor-
tionality in relation to Art. 1(2) of the EU Parent Subsidiary 
Directive could also be transposed to art. 9 of the EU-Swiss 
amending protocol to the Savings Agreement which contains 
a very similar language: “Without prejudice to the application 
of domestic or agreement-based provisions for the preven-
tion of fraud or abuse in Switzerland and in Member States, 
dividends paid by subsidiary companies to parent companies 
shall not be subject to taxation in the source State.” Accor-
dingly, it could be argued that the same limitation should apply 
with respect to dividends paid by a EU subsidiary to its Swiss 
parent company. It is therefore to be hoped that the CJEU will 
be following the reasoning of the Advocate General. 
Concluding Remarks 
At the political level, recent EU corporate tax policy has been 
marked by a shift towards fiscal protectionism. This trend is 
clearly reflected in the recently adopted ATAD. At the same 
time, however, the case law of the CJEU, with which Member 
States must comply, seems to be moving in the opposite direction: 
According to the Court, the access to information and the global 
trend towards fiscal transparency seems to support the idea that 
the same rules – in particular anti-avoidance provisions – should 
apply within and outside the European Union. It is to be hoped 
that this trend, which is fully consistent with the BEPS initia-
tive to which Switzerland is committed as a third country, will 
be confirmed by the CJEU in the coming years. 
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